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NOTE:
Can We Trust Artificial Intelligence in Criminal Law
Enforcement?
Sara M. Smyth*

INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI), sometimes called machine intelligence, is
intelligence demonstrated by machines — or computer systems — able to
perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception,
speech recognition, decision-making and language translation. Most of us are
already accustomed to using AI in all sorts of areas of our lives, such as when we
use our smartphones or when we ask Alexa — Amazon’s voice-control system —
a question, or issue a command.
With the help of AI, voice-enabled devices like Amazon Echo [i.e. ‘‘Alexa”]
are enabling the very sort of sci-fi interactions we’ve long extolled — think of the
onboard conversational computer that ran the U.S.S. Enterprise in Star Trek,
answering the crew’s requests.1 Now, we live in a world where computers really
can understand conversational speech and make our lives easier by doing a wide
range of things for us. We can walk into a dark room and ask for the lights to be
turned on; or, wake up and ask for a pot of coffee to be made. We can ask Alexa
about the weather, find recipes, get help with a math problem, order products
online, make restaurant reservations and call an Uber — all without touching
anything.2
With the rapid advances made by AI in the last few years, yet with so much
of it happening behind the scenes, it’s no wonder that most people are both
baffled and awestruck by the capacity for these systems to render humans
obsolete. Until recently, much of what the general public knew about AI,
robotics, and their superhuman capabilities came from Hollywood blockbuster
films like Minority Report. While it’s true that these films, in fact, provided a
surprisingly realistic portrait of the capabilities that AI can now deliver, there is
still a real lack of understanding on the part of most people about the profound
effects of AI upon the way we operate as a society.
With the ability to walk into a room and simply say ‘‘lights on,” it’s apparent
that we don’t need to think much about AI in the context of our routine tasks as
*
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we go about our daily lives. Yet, there are important questions to be asked
around transparency, accountability and whether we can even trust AI’s invasion
of our lives in the first place.
Recent research has uncovered the dangers of hidden bias in AI systems.
These biases can lie in the data, algorithms, and the overall design of the systems
themselves, as well as the credibility and weight assigned to their findings. 3 The
introduction of such bias should raise alarm bells when applied to a criminal
justice system that has already long imposed disproportionate burdens on racial
minorities and the poor.
Predictive algorithms, risk models, and other sorts of automated decisionmaking tools are now ubiquitous in the public service.4 Investments in these
systems are often justified by calls for administrative efficiency — doing more
with less and making decisions on a fairer and more consistent basis. They have
become powerful tools of social categorization, facilitating discrimination
between different populations through what are often vague and spurious
modes of classification. In many cases, they reinforce unjust stereotypes that are
already far too common in our criminal justice system. They are powerful forces
for control, manipulation and punishment, which can restrict people’s civil
liberties and undermine their civil rights.5

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRUST
Imagine a world where police can predict a crime before it happens. It’s
already the stuff of science fiction and Hollywood: recall Philip K. Dick’s short
story turned movie Minority Report, in which there is a special government
branch in New York, in the year 2054, called ‘‘Precrime” that apprehends those
who have been identified by three mutants — or ‘‘precogs” — as committing
murders in the future. While this is clearly fiction, police departments are
increasingly deploying data mining techniques to predict, prevent, and
investigate crime. But should we trust AI to decide who is a criminal and what
defines a crime?
From a law enforcement perspective, anonymity is the enemy. The need to
‘‘de-anonymize” the individual has long been central to solving crime.
Increasingly, this function is being undertaken by technology that augments or
replaces human capabilities altogether. Body cameras and smart glasses worn by
law enforcement are now being integrated with facial recognition and other
artificial intelligence tools, including automated analytics and database screening
capacities. As technologies progress, they are likely to be used to link biometric
identity to multidimensional surveillance (e.g., algorithmic-driven biographical
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screening and behavioural analysis).6 Body cameras may also one day be used to
assess future risk and isolate other data deemed suspicious.7
The other trend is the deployment of AI with object detection, crowd
monitoring, and feature extraction to filter, collect, and analyze the data and
create detailed profiles about individuals. The technology can detect people
walking down the street and offer information about their identities, including
their name, job, and online public profiles. The goal is to track and monitor
where people are at all times of the day and night, what they’re doing, who they
associate with, and what they believe.8 It means that just by having a snapshot of
someone, they suddenly have their entire identity.
At the same time, the reliance upon AI and the collection of vast amounts of
information poses challenges for law enforcement and the courts. Digital
policing creates a number of well-known concerns; and it can also increase the
privacy and civil liberties intrusions borne by law-abiding citizens. It can lead the
police to focus on detecting crimes committed by certain populations and in
certain locations, giving rise to concerns about racial and class bias.
Cities such as Los Angeles, Atlanta, Santa Cruz, and Seattle have used
software to predict where property crimes will occur.9 In Charlotte, North
Carolina, police compiled foreclosure data to generate a map of high-risk areas
that are likely to be struck by crime.10 In New York City, the N.Y.P.D. has
partnered with Microsoft to employ a “Domain Awareness System” that collects
and links information from various sources like CCTVs, licence plate readers,
radiation sensors, and informational databases.11
The use of predictions in policing is not new. Crime mapping, which allows
the police to allocate more resources to where crime is most likely to occur, has
been around for a very long time; and, police used to plot crime on a map — with
different coloured pins representing various crimes — to see if hot spots
emerged.12 Today’s crime-mapping technologies can produce nearly perfect
information about the frequency and geographic location of crimes in any given
area.13 Some jurisdictions have almost real-time data collection and daily reports
of problematic areas to officers in the field.14
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Other systems use social network analysis to determine which persons are at
a high risk of becoming the victims or perpetrators of violence. Just like crime
mapping, offender profiling, in which police examine psychological and
environmental factors to predict an unknown suspect’s identity or to anticipate
the next crime, is another form of prediction that has been around for a very long
time. The algorithms themselves are largely secret, but the factors include past
criminal history, arrests, parole status, and whether the target has been identified
as part of a gang. The algorithm ranks these variables to come up with a
predictive score of how “hot” individuals might be in terms of their risk.
The premise behind profiling is that a significant portion of crime occurs in
predictable patterns, and if police can find those patterns, they can either prevent
crime or catch the criminals.15 While these predictive technologies are novel, the
concerns underlying them are antiquated.16 Fears of racial bias, a lack of
transparency, data error, and the distortions of constitutional protections offer
serious challenges to the development of workable predictive policing
approaches. There are actually two separate problems at issue: the fact that
predictive policing systems have the potential for discriminatory results; and, the
lack of awareness about the efficacy and discriminatory impact of these
systems.17
Data mining is the process of using machine learning to find patterns and
relationships among different people or outcomes.18 It works by exposing a
machine learning algorithm to examples of cases with known outcomes. 19 The
system then builds a predictive model — a set of correlations that determine
which associated attributes can serve as useful proxies for an otherwise
unobservable outcome.20 Once those attributes are discovered, the system
compares new subjects’ traits to those observed attributes to make predictions
about the outcome.
Yet, data mining systems also incorporate a series of human-made decisions
that can create or exacerbate discriminatory outcomes, independent of any intent
to do so.21 For example, some use data about past criminal activity, such as
crime locations and arrest records. In other cases, data mining companies
purchase tools ‘‘largely developed by and for the commercial world,” as well as
data from social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.22
When police allocate more resources to areas where there has been more
crime in the past, crimes in those areas will be over-represented in future data. 23
15
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Furthermore, when predictive policing is used to decipher where to put more
officers, this creates a ‘‘positive feedback loop” that skews future data, as the
increased police presence will lead to the detection of more crime in that area. 24
These systems can also lead to extra monitoring of individuals, and when a crime
occurs, police might be more likely to look at them first.25
Over time, the appearance of greater threat levels in minority
neighbourhoods could inflame an already adversarial relationship with police
and put lives at risk. For example, increased police presence means a greater
likelihood of police-citizen encounters. If a high percentage of stop and frisks
turn out to be erroneous, this results in an unnecessary infringement on personal
liberty.26 Whether they view this as a helpful presence or reject it as an
unnecessary interference with their liberty, residents in these areas are forced
endure ongoing police surveillance as an ever-present daily reality.27 The
perception of mistreatment only undermines the legitimacy of the front-line
responders in these areas.28
In August 2016, 17 civil rights organizations released a joint statement on the
civil rights concerns of predictive policing, emphasizing the possibility of racist
outcomes, as well as the lack of transparency, public debate, and attention to
community needs.29 The way police are using these technologies means more
people of colour are arrested, jailed, or physically harmed by police, while the
needs of communities are often ignored. We must keep in mind that policing is
different from other fields that have embraced AI because the police act with
enormous discretion: they choose where to focus their attention, whom to detain,
arrest, and even when to use deadly force.30 The type of AI utilized thus has
significant implications for both power and accountability in policing.
Since all humans exhibit unconscious bias, it’s clear that police officers do
too. The fact of unconscious bias is widely acknowledged; and, thus, it seems to
make good sense to take at least some discretion away from unreliable human
officers and give it to a seemingly neutral technology. Yet, researchers have
found that ‘‘seemingly objective” algorithms can reproduce the very same biases
of the engineers who designed them — not to mention the officers who are tasked
with using them on the street.
Knowledge of crime patterns in a particular area can make an officer’s
observations appear more reasonable where that knowledge is tied to the
suspicion of the observed person.31 However, if the reference to a high-crime area
23
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weighs in favour of reasonable suspicion, this means that the same activity in one
neighbourhood (i.e. a high-crime area), but not in another (i.e. a low-crime area),
may rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. Yet, the same objective standard of
reasonable suspicion is assumed to apply in all neighbourhoods and to all
people.32 Furthermore, some courts have expressed concern or confusion about
what a high-crime area is, or how it should be weighed against other factors in
the reasonable suspicion analysis; and, courts have developed different standards
and solutions to resolve the issue.33 This raises fairness concerns, including
‘‘issues of race, class, and place”.34
New high-tech tools allow for more precise measuring and tracking, better
sharing of information, and the possibility of identifying racial bias. In a perfect
world, automated decision-making could be used to apply the rules in each case
consistently and without prejudice. With this aim, data-driven risk assessment
tools are being used to set bail, determine sentences, and even contribute to
determinations about guilt or innocence.
These systems operate on the basis that a data subject’s expected outcome for
some query is similar to other people with whom he or she shares relevant
attributes, like age, sex, geography, family background, and employment status.
As a result, two people accused of the same crime may receive different bail or
sentencing outcomes based on inputs that are beyond their control, and which
they have no way of assessing or challenging. As criminal justice algorithms have
come into more widespread use, they have also come under greater scrutiny.
They have been criticized for being unclear, unreliable, and even
unconstitutional. It’s evident, for example, that risk assessment scores used in
criminal sentencing overestimate black recidivism and underestimate white
recidivism.35
Another example of AI at work in the criminal justice system is the use of
algorithms to decide a defendant’s potential recidivism. Courts across the United
States are already using this tool. There are a lot of factors that go into making
the determination and the exact formula is proprietary. What we do know is that
the technology promises to bring uniformity, fairness and scientific discipline to
an area of law that has always been arbitrary and capricious.
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Proponents argue the software is ground breaking and revolutionary. More
importantly, an algorithm isn’t biased. It appears to be efficient, precise, and
immune to lapses in judgment. Yet many have argued that the data is biased — it
sentences African-Americans and Latinos disproportionately to whites for the
same crimes. Yet, so do judges. So, the algorithm is said to be an improvement —
a check on an already flawed system. But the algorithm has no historical context.
It can’t account for the factors that influence disproportionately higher rates of
incarceration for minorities across the United States.
The Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions,
or COMPAS, created by the for-profit company Northpointe, aims, and claims,
to predict an individual’s risk of recidivism. It assesses variables under five main
areas: criminal involvement, relationships/lifestyles, personality/attitudes, family,
and social exclusion. In addition, it evaluates nearly two dozen so-called
‘‘criminogenic needs” that relate to the major theories of criminality, including
‘‘criminal personality,” ‘‘social isolation,” ‘‘substance abuse” and ‘‘residence/
stability”. Defendants are ranked low, medium or high risk in each category.
Although these risk categories may be presented in ‘‘neutral” language, often
moral evaluations — judgments about who is good and who is bad — are hidden
in the technical wording; and, riskiness is assessed behind the scenes, by secret
algorithms.36
Nevertheless, the use of such algorithms in risk assessment is becoming
increasingly common in courtrooms across the United States. They are being
used to make decisions about who can be released at every stage of the criminal
justice system, from assigning bail amounts — as is the case in Fort Lauderdale
— to even more significant decisions about defendants’ liberty. In Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin, the results of such assessments are given to judges during
criminal sentencing.
Not only do these techniques largely do away with judicial discretion in
sentencing matters, they compound racially based harms because they are used to
determine an offender’s propensity for recidivism based on attributes held by
other people. In other words, the data relied on to determine a particular
offender’s level of risk is comprised of the recidivism rates collected from
multiple sample populations of released offenders for a specific period of time.
COMPAS then compares the offender’s information with the group data to
generate a ‘‘risk score” meant to predict the likelihood that those with a similar
history of offending are either more or less likely to commit another crime
following release from custody. Moreover, since the system not only measures
risk, but a variety of other vague and spurious criteria, including, ‘‘criminal
personality,” ‘‘social isolation,” ‘‘substance abuse” and ‘‘residence/stability,” the
results can easily be prone to misinterpretation and manipulation, not to mention
false positives.
36
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Wisconsin has been among the most eager and expansive users of
Northpointe’s risk assessment tool in sentencing decisions. In 2012, the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections launched the use of the software
throughout the state. It is now used at each step in the prison system, from
sentencing to parole. Once a defendant is convicted of a felony anywhere in the
state, the Department of Corrections attaches a COMPAS assessment to the
confidential pre-sentence report given to judges.37
On August 12, 2013, Circuit Court Judge Scott Horne in La Crosse County,
Wisconsin, relied on the defendant Eric Loomis’s COMPAS assessment as one of
several factors when deciding his sentence. As part of his explanation for the
sentence, Judge Horne stated: ‘‘You’re identified, through the COMPAS
assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community. In terms of
weighing the various factors, I’m ruling out probation because of the seriousness
of the crime and because your history, your history on supervision, and the risk
assessment tools that have been utilized, suggest that [you’re] extremely high risk
to reoffend.”38 He then imposed a sentence of eight years and six months in
prison.
Loomis, who was charged with driving a stolen vehicle and fleeing from
police, challenged the sentencing court’s reliance on the COMPAS assessment as
a violation of his due process rights because he could not contest the scientific
validity of the assessment due to Northpointe’s proprietary claim over the
software’s algorithm.39 The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin certified an appeal to
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, noting that: ‘‘the lack of transparency
regarding COMPAS appears to present a unique sentencing situation and,
therefore, is suitable for supreme court review”.40
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,41 the state opposed Loomis’s
request for a resentencing hearing and defended the use of the COMPAS score
on the basis that judges can consider it in addition to other factors. The Court
agreed and held that: ‘‘. . . because the circuit court explained that its
consideration of the COMPAS risk scores was supported by other independent
factors, its use was not determinative in deciding whether Loomis could be
supervised safely and effectively in the community. Therefore, the circuit court
did not erroneously exercise its discretion.”42
Indeed, the circuit court ‘‘considered multiple factors that supported the
sentence it imposed,” particularly, ‘‘the seriousness of the crime and Loomis’s
criminal history . . . [which] . . . both bear a nexus to the sentence imposed”. 43
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This is consistent with the principle that the court should consider many factors
in sentencing, including ‘‘the past record of criminal offenses, history of
undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence investigation”.44 Thus,
the court concluded that the use of the COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing
did not violate Loomis’s right to due process.45
The attractiveness of a system like COMPAS is that it purports to inject
objectivity into a criminal justice system that has been compromised, far too
many times, by human error through bias, racism, xenophobia, stereotyping, and
discrimination. However, this seemingly compelling solution overlooks the fact
that algorithms, their ‘‘science” notwithstanding, are as fallible as the people, and
the institutions, that write them.46 Furthermore, if private companies like
Northpointe can keep their algorithms confidential, by claiming that they are
trade secrets, no one will ever truly know how the system calculates risk.
When mental health professionals and other experts give evidence in court
about an offender’s risk of reoffending, they are typically cross-examined, and
this process provides an opportunity to test the evidence for the truth of its
contents, as well as to question the credibility of the witness. Yet, since a software
program, like COMPAS, can never be examined or deposed — and neither can
its makers be compelled to reveal the ‘‘trade secrets” behind their methods —
there is the obvious potential for juries and judges to misunderstand and misuse
the results, assigning greater accuracy to predicted outcomes than is warranted. 47
As well, such risk assessments classify individuals within a group as low, medium
or high risk; yet, they cannot say exactly where in this group the individual lies,
and therefore cannot pinpoint the precise risk the individual poses. 48
Assigning risk to an individual based on group characteristics can lead to
inaccurate assessments; and, if these inaccuracies cannot be teased out through
cross-examination, this has the practical effect of turning a tool for the
assessment of probabilities for future offending into something relied on as
empirically infallible. That seems to upend principles of due process, fairness,
and the right of the defendant to make full answer and defence. This is
particularly true given that these tools give scientific value to estimations that
actually perform less well than chance.49
In fact, research carried out by ProPublica demonstrated that the results
produced by COMPAS are dubious and racially biased against minorities. They
obtained the risk scores assigned to more than 7,000 people arrested in Broward
44
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County, Florida, in 2013 and 2014 and checked to see how many were charged
with new crimes over the next two years, the same benchmark used by the
creators of the algorithm. The score proved unreliable in forecasting violent
crime: only 20 percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually
went on to do so. When a full range of crimes were considered — including
misdemeanors such as driving with an expired licence — the algorithm was just
slightly more accurate than a coin toss. Of those deemed likely to reoffend, only
61 per cent were arrested for a subsequent crime within two years.
ProPublica also uncovered significant racial disparities. In forecasting who
would reoffend, the algorithm made mistakes with African-American and white
defendants at roughly the same rate but in very different ways: the system was
particularly likely to falsely flag African-American defendants as future
criminals, wrongly labelling them this way at almost twice the rate as white
defendants; and white defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often than
African-American defendants. African-American defendants were 77 per cent
more likely to be pegged at higher risk of committing a future violent crime and
45 per cent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime of any kind than
whites. Thus, not only may these risk scores be injecting bias into the courts that
use them, they may also be inflaming unfair disparities.
Notably, despite ruling against Loomis, even the Wisconsin Supreme Court
seemed uneasy about using a secret algorithm to send a man to prison. Justice
Ann Walsh Bradley, writing for the court, discussed the ProPublica report about
COMPAS: ‘‘[a] recent analysis of COMPAS’s recidivism scores based upon data
from 10,000 criminal defendants in Broward County, Florida, concluded that
black defendants ‘were far more likely than white defendants to be incorrectly
judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism.’ Likewise, white defendants were more
likely than black defendants to be incorrectly flagged as low risk.” 50 She further
observed that, ‘‘this study and others raise concerns regarding how a COMPAS
assessment’s risk factors correlate with race”.51
In the end, though, Justice Bradley allowed sentencing judges to use
COMPAS. However, she warned that judges must proceed with caution when
using such risk assessments. They must take account of the algorithm’s
limitations and the secrecy surrounding it, but said the software could be
helpful, ‘‘in providing the sentencing court with as much information as possible
in order to arrive at an individualized sentence”.52
To ensure that judges weigh risk assessments appropriately, the court advised
both how these assessments must be presented to trial courts and the extent to
which judges may use them. The court explained that risk scores may not be
used, ‘‘to determine whether an offender is incarcerated”; or, ‘‘to determine the
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severity of the sentence.”53 Therefore, judges using risk assessments must explain
the factors other than the assessment that support the sentence imposed.
Furthermore, presentence investigation reports that incorporate a COMPAS
assessment must include five written warnings for judges: first, the ‘‘proprietary
nature of COMPAS” prevents the disclosure of how risk scores are calculated;
second, COMPAS scores are unable to identify specific high-risk individuals
because these scores rely on group data; third, although COMPAS relies on a
national data sample, there has been ‘‘no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin
population”; fourth, studies ‘‘have raised questions about whether [COMPAS
scores] disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a higher risk of
recidivism”; and fifth, COMPAS was developed specifically to assist the
Department of Corrections in making post-sentencing determinations.54 In
issuing these warnings, the court made clear its desire to cast doubt upon the
tool’s accuracy and reliability.

CONCLUSION
The use of big data has already become a routine aspect of policing. These
tools have clear benefits, including providing insights about how to direct police
resources efficiently and effectively in ways that traditional policing methods
have not been able to deliver. Digital policing helps reduce the criminal justice
system’s overall burden, creating economies of scale in law enforcement and
allowing police departments to maximize their limited resources. 55 One
consequence is that digital policing will usually require offenders to expend
more resources to plan, execute, and cover-up their crimes; and, this can lead to
increased deterrence of some offenders as well as a greater number of crimes
interrupted by the police before the offender can complete them. 56
At the same time, this reliance upon artificial intelligence and the collection
of vast amounts of information poses challenges for law enforcement and the
courts. Digital policing creates a number of well-known concerns and it can also
increase the privacy and civil liberties intrusions borne by law-abiding citizens. It
can lead the police to focus on detecting crimes committed by certain populations
and in certain locations, giving rise to concerns about racial and class bias.
Furthermore, without adequate legal safeguards, once this data is collected and
stored in bulk, it can be shared among various entities, including state and local
law enforcement, the federal government, private contractors, civilian agencies,
and the intelligence and military communities. 57
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